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ABSTRACT: This Introduction first proposes a definitional map applicable to 
the racial nationalisms currently ascendant in Britain (and Western Europe, 
more broadly). The paper then outlines the respective contributions to the 
Special Issue – with an emphasis on the politics of bordering that organises 
today so much of nationalism’s claim on the state. The second half of the 
paper thereupon establishes a wider conjunctural context within which such 
analyses can be most productively read. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s formative 
analysis, we argue that it is an understanding of the distinctly contradictory 
drives intrinsic to recent capitalism that is required. Through mapping the 
uneasy nation/market bind constitutive of the ‘Little Englander’ political 
subjectivity that Thatcherism forged, this section focuses on the ‘disjuncture’ 
that has emerged in the intervening period, a disjuncture that has seen the 
various nationalist drives in the body politic obtain today a more pronounced 
political autonomy. The paper ends with some reflections on the ‘postcolonial 
melancholia’ that constitutes a uniquely catalysing nationalist force in British 
politics, a force that capitalises on this above disjuncture in a particularly 
morbid and hubristic manner.   
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Uncertainty continues to prevail since the decision by the British electorate to 
change the United Kingdom’s relationship to Europe. Of course, so very much has 
been said about ‘Brexit’ that it remains a thankless task to confidently isolate any 
key prevailing impressions. The nigh unprecedented turn to an inward 
nationalism – anxious, defensive and resentful – can certainly be attributed to a 
range of prevailing circumstances. For instance, much analysis has foregrounded 
the era-defining economic restructuring – as recession, austerity and 
marketization – by which the 20th Century social mobility contract has ground to 
a juddering halt. A contiguous commentary has focused on the increased 
melancholic revanchism that arises when Europe has ceased to enjoy the global 
economic privileges and pre-eminence that it has erstwhile been accustomed to 
(Mbembe, 2018a: 1). Even more prominent has been the often apologist claims 
that the nationalist turn is a ‘backlash’ by silent majorities against the perceived 
advance of socially liberal norms and demographic reconstitution. Elsewhere, a 
more generative commentary has foregrounded the destabilizing effects of shifts 
in our media culture – digital and online affordances that result in a 
technologically mediated collapse in the legitimacy of elites and state 
institutions. These mooted themes, in traversing economics, cultural backlash 
and media structures, preclude in turn a well-harmonized analysis vis-à-vis the 
resurgence of nationalism.i  
 
There does however seem to be one emergent consensus that has taken shape 
across these disparate accounts: namely, it is increasingly clear that whatever 
the underlying factors, the European Union (EU) referendum was primarily 
framed in the popular imagination by the overdetermined issue of immigration 
and wider cognate anxieties regarding race and ethnic difference.ii Most overtly, 
this included the toxic fault-line that EU free movement came to represent in the 
public debate: both as an internal expanse where Eastern and Southern 
Europeans are alleged to be enjoying excessive access to Britain’s economic and 
social goods, but also as a conduit for dark-skinned refugees to march across 
uninhibited to the sweet fields of England. And though less decisive to the public 
discourse, other similarly charged themes that gained prominence as the 
referendum campaigning intensified included: the disingenuous hectoring about 
the prospect of Turkey (read Muslims) acceding to the EU, various coded 
remarks about the Roma (but also Romanians, who were often publically read 
through the ‘Roma frame’ [Fox et al. 2012]), and even the many strained if ill-
informed comments about the tyranny of anti-racist political correctness that 
ECHR iii  technocrats were said to be upholding (Chowdhury and Shiner, 
forthcoming). Seen accordingly in its entirety, Brexit signaled one significant 
instantiation of a successful new nationalist political programme that hinges 
substantially on the ostensible problems of immigration, multiculturalism, and 
ethnic diversity more broadly. Indeed, whilst this new nationalist orientation is 
not without alternatives – as evidenced by some of the resurgent autonomous 
left organizing that has underpinned the more progressive aspects of Labour’s 
rehabilitation of a social democracy-cum-urban liberalism pivot – it remains a 
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truism to note that the idea of nation has emphatically recovered its political 
confidence.  
 
But what specifically renders this recourse to nation, nationalism? Whilst 
cognizant of definitional work’s multiple hazards, we tentatively note that 
today’s nationalism might be best understood as the set of discourses by which 
primary culpability for significant sociopolitical problems, whether real or 
imagined, is attributed to various ethno-racial communities who are understood 
as not belonging (Valluvan, 2019: 36). Any such definition will seem counter-
intuitive when read against the more established literature on the subject. After 
all, nation itself can certainly be understood as so much more, relating to various 
fundamental conceptions (even if misplaced in our opinion) of community, 
collective culture, historical time, and also wider demarcations of what political 
sovereignty amounts to in modernity. We do not deny this. Western nationalism 
however, as a specific political temperament, trades on a simpler principle – a 
principle that turns, in the first instance, on the exclusionary politics of Othering.  
 
It might admittedly seem too obvious, too tautological, to say here that the 
nation is committed to a series of exclusionary distinctions. For instance, the 
notion of an exclusionary reality is readily apparent in the nation-state 
imagination’s own very proud assertion of its ‘irremediable particularity’ 
(Anderson, 1983: 5). This is, in other words, an assertion that is intrinsically 
exclusionary: put simply, to be something particular is to preclude the possibility 
of being something else. Similarly, the nation-state remains necessarily 
exclusionary in its very mechanical configuration: the provisioning of passports, 
voting privileges, welfare rights and so forth does of course exclude those not of 
that nation-state. (For instance, if one is going to one university, it is likely the 
case that one is not of a different university; the same prosaic observation might 
be said of the nation-state.) In turn, in this precise sense of the nation-state’s 
very configuration and claim to being, it might seem all too circular to assert a 
definitional emphasis on exclusion. 
 
Our contention is however less concerned with the nation in itself. It is instead 
the specifics of nationalism, as a distinct political mentality, that is our priority 
here. Nationalism, to our mind, exceeds a simple descriptive characterization of 
the nation-state’s territorialized institutionalization. Namely, the distinctiveness 
of contemporary nationalism as a political logic is that it marks a process 
through which a self-appointed normative majority attributes its putative 
socioeconomic, cultural and security concerns to the excessive presence and 
allowance made to those understood as outsiders. Nationalism concerns, in other 
words, those moments where political discourse reserves an outsized place for 
the problems putatively posed by those who do not belong. It is herein less an 
affirmative politics of strong belonging and more a negational politics of aversion 
and disavowal (Gilroy, 1987: 49-50; Hall, 1992: 188; Yuval-Davis, 2006: 204). 
Needless to say, those who comprise the relevant field of Othered non-belonging 
include the variously racialised ethnic minorities but also select foreign peoples 
and/or international forces, some of which intertwine with and reinforce the 




The anxieties attributed today to such iconic figures of non-belonging assume 
many guises. These are, for instance, the myriad and at times contradictory 
anxieties written upon the figure of the migrant – as labour migrant, as welfare 
tourist, as culturally adversarial refugee, and, albeit less frequently, as crass 
foreign capitalists. Such assorted anxieties are not however operating in a 
discursive vacuum neatly contained to figure of the imminent migrant arrival. 
Instead, the hostility that meets the migrant lies, in part, in its palimpsest quality 
– where the pathologisation of immigration is written upon the well-rehearsed 
scripts by which the nation’s already existing internal Others have been 
characterized (Gilroy, 1987). As far as Britain is concerned, these include the 
anxieties attributed to the black city and its criminal propensities and, of course, 
the increasingly trenchant anxieties tied to the Muslim – as culturally regressive, 
misogynist, violent, proselytizing, and, perhaps most invidiously, as fecund, 
protean and ungrateful (Hage, 2017).  
 
It is uncontroversial to note that the electoral map is being emphatically remade 
by the advances of these above political assertions, assertions that demand less 
equivocating responses to the threats these multiple but often overlapping 
outsiders represent. Relatedly, nationalist solutions increasingly obtain a 
panacean value in the popular imagination, suggesting that various challenges 
characteristic of the present will dissipate through both reducing the presence of 
such significant Others as well as formally circumscribing their scope for 
disruption. And importantly, these anxieties that cluster around such a 
multiplying cast of nationalist disavowal also convert into forceful political 
demands upon the state. It is namely via specific state contexts that these fears 
manifest, organize and propagate – wherein public institutions become the site 
at which these fears become a repressive reality. Put differently, such nationalist 
assertions are not only discursive ‘distortions’ of the political but they are also 
active claims upon state practice. Indeed, as put in the memorable words of 
Hannah Arendt (1951: 275), nationalism might be best seen as the terms by 
which the ‘the nation conquers the state’.  
 
Today’s bending of the British state towards more avowedly nationalist 
imperatives is increasingly undeniable. Consider here, alongside the summary 
end to EU free movement that Brexit most starkly represents, the much 
discussed ‘hostile environment’ and its policy aim to make immanent the 
‘illegalization’ (de Genova, 2002) of denizens deemed expendable/undesirable. 
Consider too the wider attempts to further render welfare access contingent to 
immigration status, the stripping of student visas of the right to work, the 
entrenchment of prohibitive salary thresholds as regards work-permits, as well 
as the gutting of family reunification protections. Parallel to this move to ‘erect 
the barricades’ (Malik, 2018) vis-à-vis immigration, which remains the 
archetypically populist instruction of our era, we also see in Britain a 
complementary recourse to integrationist measures – already rehearsed during 
Blairism via the turn towards ‘community cohesion’ policies but further 
entrenched in the notorious Casey Review of 2016 and the wider machinations 
of contemporary Tory-led governments. This is a resurgent integration conceit 
(Back et al. 2002; Kundnani, 2007; McGhee, 2008) that trades on an 
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unequivocally nationalist premise – presuming that the coherence and integrity 
of the nation, in its distinctly majoritarian sense, is being imperiled by the excess 
presence of ‘alien’ cultures (not least, Muslims) incompatible with the national 
polity – alien cultures that are in need of remedial redress and/or active 
proscription.  
 
A proper social science reckoning with contemporary nationalism requires in 
turn a conjoined emphasis, one that is able to unpack the prominence of various 
racialised Others in underpinning the renewed appeal of the nation’s political 
mandate but also tracking how this translates into assorted institutional 
practices as guided by nationalism. This is not to exhaust the centrality of 
racialised outsiders to nationalist projects in the West, but it simply reconfirms 
the importance of race (and as the far as the UK is concerned, imperialism) to 
any credible account of that very project.  
 
II. Bordering, exclusion and nationalist statecraft  
 
This Special Issue will accordingly navigate today’s reconsolidated nationalism 
by addressing its affinity to multiple racialised narratives and attendant state 
practices. Unsurprisingly, a recurring emphasis of many of the articles centers on 
the dehumanization of the refugee and therein the constitutive fortification and 
violences that flow from this dehumanization. This emphasis is a deliberate one, 
ably attending to a theme that has become the centerpiece of much 
contemporary analysis of racial nationalisms: i.e. the border and bordering. 
Whilst much early 21st Century writing in Europe situated the toxic racial politics 
of nation within the policy mantras of integration/community cohesion agendas, 
there has been a concerted turn in recent research towards the hard materiality 
of borders (Anderson, 2013; El-Enany, 2019; Yuval-Davis et al. 2018). Luke de 
Noronha’s contribution to this Special Issue acts in turn as a particularly 
generative distillation of this emergent writing on the border – noting how it is 
through border practices that race-meaning often gets made and assigned, 
leading to the codified stratification of human worth and disposability as well as 
rendering those who obtain less-than-citizen status vulnerable to different forms 
of economic exploitation (Bhattacharyya, 2018). Building implicitly upon Back 
and Sinha’s (2018: 138) reading of how fragmented citizenship status and 
practices of migrant vilification intersect to constitute ‘new hierarchies of 
belonging’, de Noronha brings into sharp relief the centrality of border practices 
to today’s social and political constitution. He also gives unique attention to how 
the ‘race-making’ done through bordering has found particularly sharp 
expression through the multiplying deportation regimes common to modern 
statecraft. Distinctive about de Noronha’s contribution here is the attentiveness 
to the intimately told human tragedies that accrue through the otherwise 
impersonal materiality of border-practice. Drawing upon a rich vein of 
ethnographic writing, de Noronha allows the narratives of two black men (Jason 
and Ricardo) deported to Jamaica to take centre-stage, finding in their pained 
recollections of a life denied the unique mechanisms by which bordering and 
racialization intertwine – a logic that, in the instances of Jason and Ricardo, 
reaches for racialised conceptions of criminality and expendability in refusing 
people the only place they’ve known, since childhood, to be home (London).  
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The violence of bordering that de Noronha foregrounds is not however to be 
situated only at the level of the state. As has been widely commented upon with 
heightened alarm, the racialised logics demanding the consolidation of the nation 
(Jones et al. 2017) does also sublimate into a pointed form of civic violence. Put 
differently, the increasingly militant assertions of national ruination that a 
treacherously ‘liberal’ ruling class is said to be presiding over gradually 
emboldens an appetite for vigilante fascism. As Hannah Jones argues in this 
Special Issue, the murder of the pro-Remain MP Jo Cox by a far-right sympathizer 
was a particularly stark moment that signals the intensified violence that this 
nationalist threshold threatens. Jones accordingly employs a highly textured 
reading of how the lethal violence exercised by members of the public is not only 
sourced in existing dominant discursive frameworks, but equally, the violence 
itself becomes denied, reframed and/or seen as exceptional aberrations, not 
warranting any meaningful political reflection.v In other words, this case also 
illustrates the way in which the security state works through racialized 
conceptions of who constitutes a threat: i.e. the ‘Muslim male’ as a distinctly 
‘cultural’ problem versus Jo Cox’s murderer as the proverbial ‘lone wolf’ with a 
history of mental health troubles.  
 
However, as opposed to it being merely an indication of racial nationalism’s 
incendiary horizons, Jones also focuses on the grassroots resistance that finds 
expression in the wake of such moments. It is evident that such threshold 
moments can act as a galvanizing node around which a popular dissent can 
congeal; but, as Jones again notes, the possibilities of popular resistance that 
emerged in the aftermath of the murder of Jo Cox are not without their own 
contradictions. Jones demonstrates how the resistance that might be construed 
as ‘mainstream’ often tends towards highly patriarchal renditions of opposition 
circumscribed by liberal propriety – yielding, in turn, ineffectual and at times 
complicit forms of resistance. For instance, as Jones asks, is it sufficient or even 
practicable to simply assert a populist rhetoric of commonality against a 
perceived politics of ‘hate’ and ‘division’? Does the more politically durable move 
lie instead in a more confrontational politics, nurturing much more avowedly 
radical alternatives regarding the conceptions of belonging and primordial 
origins that are otherwise the preserve of the nation-myth that the far right 
deploys so effectively?  
 
Madeline-Sophie Abbas’s article explores a similar tension in how the popular 
challenge to anti-refugee politics often calls upon a language of liberal humanism 
and yet it is that self-same language which subsequently becomes prominent in 
discrediting the desirability of refugees – e.g. prospective refugees as the bearers 
of illiberal cultures and pathology. Abbas develops here an arresting notion of 
the ‘concentrationary gothic’; a concept which helps explore how the barbarisms 
as ascribed to the specter of the Muslim – scripts that reach deep into the 
colonial archive of Orientalist ‘demonology’ (Said, 1978: 26) – stunt and undo 
any initial compulsion towards ‘compassion’. Malcolm James’s paper extends and 
situates these contradictions within the more visceral frontline that the 
Mediterranean today represents. The so-called ‘refugee crisis’, more properly 
understood as the human crisis produced by state-enforced borders (Trilling, 
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2019), has become perhaps the starkest expression of contemporary 
nationalism’s human detritus. A callous matrix of cruelty has been erected across 
the Mediterranean – wherein camps, border patrols, traffickers, and vigilante 
nativist mobs at sea and on land, all interweave to realize a thick web of 
dehumanization geared towards repelling the refugees fleeing war, 
environmental degradation and/or abject poverty. These are namely the 
multiple mechanisms constitutive of a ‘Fortress Europe’ that render real the 
‘death-worlds’ (Mbembe, 2003) in which people are left to die and/or endure a 
perpetual wretchedness. James, drawing poetically upon his own experience 
volunteering at one of the epicenters of this human crisis (the Greek island of 
Chios), patiently tracks the projections of this cruelty. James does not however 
leave the reader only with this dense miasma of cruelty, insisting upon the 
alternative structures of care that also emerged in the midst of the crisis – 
improvised circuits of care that tie together refugees’ resourceful efforts to assist 
each other, local residents’ makeshift attempts to provision everyday support 
and solidarity, as well as the concerned volunteers from across the world that 
descended upon these frontline Greek locations. It is accordingly these 
interweaving webs of ‘care and cruelty’ that James places at the heart of the 
reconsolidated racial nationalisms that the European continent is once again 
contending with. James warns against only seeing in the present an unassailable 
sea of cruelty, implicitly arguing that to render cruelty the sole object of analysis 
is to render it sublime – a sublimity that invites, in time, a resigned quietism.   
 
These respective articles help us think herein about how a confident anti-
nationalist politics would first have to mobilize against the distinct racial work 
the national border currently does. It is at the border where the most rabid racial 
formulations of a nationalist politics are most emphatically invested; and it is 
accordingly at the border that such politics can be most meaningfully challenged. 
Such interventions become particularly salutary when recognizing that the 
concerted anti-immigrant and neo-imperialvi politics of borders is hardly a 
unique preserve of the right, whether extreme or mainstream (Mondon and 
Winter, 2017). It is apparent that many on the left too have become reattached to 
the border as a political horizon, whereby, through conviction and/or 
opportunism, they see in politics of immigration and community a possibility for 
populist appeal. This renewed left nationalism was endorsed in particularly 
slapdash terms in Angela Nagle’s (2019) now well-flogged ‘The Left Case for 
Borders’ as well as in the proliferation across Europe of ‘new’ left parties that 
press anti-immigration positions.vii But it is also apparent in the frustrating 
indecision of the current Labour leadership who, though issuing some not 
insubstantial critiques of detention and deportation, still seem resolutely 
wedded to a reassertion of border control as well as frequently rehabilitating 
those nationalist mantras that work through a white working-class mythology.  
 
Indeed, a particularly awkward fact about the current political repertoire is that 
a newly confident nationalist politics is able to present itself as the voice of the 
dispossessed, the working class, the welfare state, and other cognate left-of-
centre 20th century emphases. This is a form of nationalist positioning that 
presses a pronounced sense of class injury and various putatively ‘anti-
establishment’ allusions. There is, of course, a perennially frustrating disconnect 
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here – where the nationalist claim to anti-market and/or anti-establishment 
solidarity is contradicted by its more immediate harangues against other 
marginalized working-class communities (existing minorities) and outsiders 
(migrants and refugees), rendering their presence undesirable whilst also 
undercutting any even residual notion of a decidedly global anti-capitalist 
identification. It is against this context that Ben Pitcher sets out in this Special 
Issue a series of original inquiries. Does a sustained challenge against nationalist 
discourses also have to consequently interrogate it as a matter of ‘form’; 
wherein, it becomes necessary to ask how contemporary nationalism has 
become contoured by an anti-establishment populism and what kind of 
complication does this pose to the task of resistance and critique? Put differently, 
does a straightforward assertion of anti-racism without robustly contesting the 
anti-establishment paraphernalia that couches populist demagoguery simply 
lend further credibility to the nationalist conceit? Similarly, as follows the 
necessarily introspective turn in contemporary left theory (Fassin 2019; Mouffe, 
2018), Pitcher sensitively asks whether the anti-racist left requires its own 
competing populist discourse or is populism, by the very nature of its underlying 
premises, the preserve of normative nativism? 
 
Pitcher helps in turn press this Special Issue towards the contradictory tensions 
that suffuse both the assertions of but also challenges to nationalism’s 
heightened appeal. It is also here that this Special Issue’s final article presses a 
series of generative questions. Richard Bramwell and James Butterworth’s 
contribution reminds us, in contrast to the nativist circumscribing of what 
national belonging entails, that research needs to stay alive to the many 
intuitively cosmopolitan renditions of belonging that also vie for prominence. 
The authors give extended attention here to how young urban minorities, 
through the practices that underpin popular cultural expression such as grime 
and hip-hop, ably claim the nation in an unapologetic and irreverent manner. 
Developing an original sense of the ‘translocality’ that suffuses black-led urban 
cultural expression, Bramwell and Butterworth foreground how an alternative 
conception of English belonging becomes rooted across those cities 
characterized by multiculture. They consequently ask whether this rhizomatic 
cultural geography that stiches together cities as scattered across England can 
represent a productive counterpoint to how the nation might be popularly 
engaged; this being an engagement that is thoroughly indifferent to the ‘pastoral’ 
visioning of English idylls and white homogeneity and sets instead a decidedly 
diverse and decidedly disheveled aesthetic of the city as the focal point of 
belonging.  
 
These questions that Bramwell and Butterworth revive are certainly not new. 
The decorated tradition of British Cultural Studies that they build upon has 
consistently flagged the political promise of those urban cultures as developed in 
the crucible of diasporic culture hostile to the illusory clarity and comforts of 
communitarian belonging. Put differently, the multiethnic urban margins have 
often acted as the vanguard for alternative templates of an ‘unkempt and unruly’ 
(Gilroy, 2004: x) multicultural belonging. The reach of such politics is however 
frequently frustrated by various structural demarcations – contending with state 
criminalization of the cultural practices associated with blackness; the inevitable 
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limits of ‘youth’ cultural orientations and subcultural isolation; as well as the 
wider forms of commercialized cooption that might defuse the otherwise 
subversive strain intrinsic to such cultural expression. These are questions that 
left cultural theory has always had to contend with and they remain tensions 
that Bramwell and Butterworth write through with a considered balance: 
wherein, to insist upon alternative horizons, as sourced in the minor keys of 
today, always remains, however thankless, a fundamental task for critical 
analysis that is also affirmative.  
 
III. Capitalism, ‘authoritarian populism’ and ‘Little Englander’ nationalisms     
 
In sum, the above papers all profile a nationalist crisis where the refugee and the 
migrant become the primary objects of political discourse and the border the 
primary political solution. It is however the case that today’s nationalist 
positioning, and the racial demons that such positioning turns on, is often 
subjected to a materialist analysis – one which reads such politics as 
symptomatic of wider economic stagnation, ‘austerity doctrine’, and post-
industrial abjections more broadly. Whilst this is certainly important, it is also 
apparent that such epiphenomenal readings often tend towards a flattened 
reductionism that not only circumvents an analytic feel for contradiction but also 
disregards the specific question of why precisely does the nation and whiteness 
become such inviting conduits through which people are meant to make sense of 
the economic distress they experience. Put bluntly, the outstanding question that 
remains unanswered here is why is the political solution to capitalist crisis to be 
found so affirmatively in enhanced state powers vis-à-vis border control.  
 
The place of capitalist developments in calibrating and/or galvanizing 
nationalism does remain important to any meaningful analysis. Indeed, in 
seeking to formulate a response to the crises instantiated by the demand for 
withdrawal from the EU, we convened in 2016 a workshop at the University of 
Manchester. Our immediate aim was to collect the insights provided by Stuart 
Hall in his formative analysis of ‘authoritarian populism’ and its pivotal place in 
the broader politics of what he famously coined as ‘Thatcherism’. The papers in 
this Special Issue derive from that workshop, but do perhaps, in retrospect, owe 
more to themes of ‘moral panic’ and ‘folk devils’ as foregrounded in Policing the 
Crisis, another enduring text by Hall (1978) and colleagues. We take the liberty, 
therefore, of reasserting in the remainder of this Introduction the necessity of 
thinking more directly through capitalism’s relationship to the wider politics of 
nation, race and the migrant outsider. Doing so establishes a wider context 
within which to situate the respective contributors’ engagement of today’s racial 
nationalisms.  
 
Interrogating the relationship between the nationalism and capitalism 
(Davidson, 2017) is no simple exercise. Our intention therefore is only to sketch, 
employing a Hallsian temperament, the importance of economic restructuring 
and class re-composition in accounting for contemporary politics whilst 
simultaneously refusing to allow such economic readings to take on a misplaced 
causal pre-eminence nor allowing such economic formulations to be read 
independently of cultural formations.   
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As has been widely observed, today’s nationalism presses multiple motifs that 
appeal to a sense of (white) working class and small town dignity that is 
increasingly presented as imperiled. Such appeals operate quite obviously 
outside of and/or against a neoliberal premise (Virdee and McGeever, 2018); 
but, crucially, this is also a nationalism that flows out of the very Thatcherite 
political pivot that consolidated that self-same neoliberal premise. It is worth 
remembering that the popular thrust of Thatcherism hinged on a pointed 
mythologization of aspirational working-class uplift as well as an 
entrepreneurial petit-bourgeois provincialism (best understood through the 
iconography of the shopkeeper that Thatcher, through her own biography, ably 
embodied). We see however that this sociocultural compact that authorized her 
parallel politics of zealous privatization has obtained today a more pronounced 
political autonomy. This is an autonomy borne out of marketization’s more 
formal material failures but also because such marketization has become 
incrementally ensconced within a wider mythology of global supranational 
politics (including the EU) that often contradicts with the imagery of provincial 
thrift that Thatcher took care to foreground so steadfastly. 
 
In prizing open this densely knotted contradiction, it is Hall’s (2018) writing on 
the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s that is formative here. Whilst it would be 
theoretically slapdash to suggest that there are multiple Capitalisms, it can be 
less controversially mooted that there are always multiple capitalist 
‘rationalities’ (Brown, 2006: 690) – insofar as, there are multiple often 
competing cultural formations constitutive of the body politic into which 
capitalism, as respective to its conjunctural exigencies, nestles itself. Hall’s 
prescient remarks in 1979 about the emergent cultural conceits that he surveyed 
on the eve of Thatcher’s first electoral triumph reveal particularly well how any 
such capitalist leap makes an active but always uncertain claim on the textures of 
the popular. As he said at the time, ‘There is still some debate as to whether 
[Thatcherism] is likely to be short-lived or long-term, a movement of the surface 
or something more deeply lodged in the body politic’ (Hall, 1979: 14).  
 
The cultural discourse Hall was bringing into view was one where the ‘vigorous 
virtues’ as ascribed to the industrious petit-bourgeois shopkeeper (‘energetic’, 
‘self-reliant’, anti-taxation) was firmly situated within a wider mythopoeia of the 
English character – as rustic, suburban, homely, respectable, familial and 
defensively ‘robust’ (Evans and Taylor, 1996: 226). Equally, in asserting this 
distinct cultural modeling of the national subject qua provincial entrepreneur, a 
series of ‘folk devils’ were identified (Hall et al. 1978): a series of dangerous 
portends and iconic sources of disruption against whom a respectable provincial 
Englishness (and the wider mandate of a ‘sadist state’ [Brown, 1988: 3]) was 
asserted. Key figures that took such enduring shape here was of course the black 
‘mugger’ of the inner city; the culturally adversarial immigrant ‘swamping’ the 
realm; and, also, a legion of allegedly deracinated leftist ideologues – both 
‘metropolitan cultural elites’ and pugnacious trade union subversives alike – 
who offend the English calling and mentality.  
 
Much of this might be already well documented (Featherstone, 2017; James and 
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Valluvan, 2018), but it is worth reiterating, lest Thatcherism risk being 
misunderstood as an abstracted exultation of ‘homo economicus’, lacking in any 
broader cultural figuration. And crucially, whilst the mobilizing of a particular 
commonsense – impressionistically sketched here as a Little Englander 
entrepreneurialism – can certainly license capitalist work (neoliberal 
marketization), it is also the case that such ‘commonsenses’ often sit uneasily vis-
à-vis the broader capitalist project they have been harnessed to. As once noted 
by the idiosyncratic John Gray (2010: 19) regarding the always-apparent 
contradictions between the dreamscapes and market principles respectively 
constitutive of Thatcherism:  
 
[Thatcher] fully shared Hayek’s view that free markets reinforce 
‘traditional values’, which is an inversion of their actual effect. The 
conservative country of which she dreamed had more in common with 
Britain in the 1950s, an artefact of Labour collectivism, than it did with 
the one that emerged from her free-market policies. [For instance], a 
highly mobile labour market enforces a regime of continuous change. The 
type of personality that thrives in these conditions is the opposite of the 
stolid, dutiful bourgeois Thatcher envisioned.  
 
Gray’s observation, though operating in a very different context to ours, helps 
clarify that any such cultural modeling – and its assorted cognitive sensibilities, 
symbolic affinities, and affective investments – is conjunctural, and is frequently 
jolted when the broader capitalist contract it is wedded to is itself restructured. 
In short, what requires acknowledgement here is that whilst appeals to nation 
can indeed do the bidding of broader capitalist exigencies, the appeal of nation, 
once re-galvanized, often exceeds, contradicts and/or subverts that initial 
capitalist programme.  
 
These reflections allow in turn for a more effective transposing of Hall’s seminal 
sense of conjuncture to the present’s distinctive sense of disjuncture. Prevailing 
sociological analysis often misses the fact that today’s nationalism is not simply a 
diversionary attempt to fill the political void that a capitalist crisis engenders. It 
is instead a fetid amplification of the nationalism that was already so deeply 
threaded through the capitalist restructuring as ‘sutured’ (Hall, 1996: 3) in the 
late 1970s/early 80s (James, 2018). Put simply, the present reveals only a 
marked deformation of this already fragile nation/capital alliance. When a faith 
in capitalist social mobility dissipates so resolutely, what remains of that residual 
governmental culture is only the rump of provincial nationalism that had 
dutifully complemented that initial faith in capitalist evangelism but was never 
simply secondary to it (Toscano, 2017).  
 
This is accordingly a provincial nationalism that has today been made starkly 
visible on its own terms, intensifying in confidence amid its partial dislodging 
from the broader capitalist thesis. Put differently, this newly liberated 
nationalism can still do the bidding of capitalist mantras, but it can also be rallied 
as a populist critique of capitalism – as anti-establishment, as anti-elite, as anti-
globalization, and as nominally pro-welfare. This is however a critique of 
capitalism that, in the final instance, necessarily favours nationalist nostrums. It 
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is, in other words, a vernacular critique that attributes to the hordes of migrants 
and inauthentic insider minorities a variety of pathologies vis-à-vis economic 
duress – as work-shy, as exploiting welfare state largesse, as further crowding an 
already distressed labour market, as straining resources, and as impinging upon 
scarce public and residential space. Relatedly, it also rails against the alleged 
generosity of development aid and/or against the unfair financial advantages 
that foreign entities are said to obtain at Britain’s expense, not least through EU 
contributions. In sum, this is a redirected anti-neoliberalism that only admits the 
nation (and is constitutive appeals and demons) as the valid site of political 
intervention and redress.   
 
This partial unmooring of nationalism from neoliberal imperatives remains to us 
an analytic angle that is all too often neglected in contemporary accounts of 
Brexit and cognate themes. But whilst such an attunement to the disjuncture of 
nationalism to neoliberal capitalism is important, equally relevant are the 
contrasting terms by which neoliberalism itself can become consumed by 
nationalism. Emergent analysis has begun to draw some attention to how the 
Brexit sponsored nationalisms currently prevalent cut across a decidedly 
contradictory relationship to capitalism. A contradiction that might be 
provisionally typified as the aforementioned petit-bourgeois protectionism that 
foregrounds a politics of provincial insularity, and on the other hand, a corporate 
multinational capitalism (global neoliberalism) still ostensibly committed to its 
ideal of borderless trade and access. However, what also remains important for 
us here is a different dimension – one where neoliberalism exists not only as a 
principle of global market dynamism but can also wield its own distinct brand of 
bordered nativism.  
 
It is of course clear today that neoliberal capitalism does hew towards a 
sustained lobbying for the EU. This is however only one expression of 
neoliberalism’s political vocabulary. There is also another neoliberal rationale 
that is not straightforwardly anti-nationalism, and, indeed, calls for its own 
brand of nationalist consolidation. Contrary to the often-Marxist readings of 
neoliberalism as summarily hostile to the nation, neoliberalism does in fact 
routinely press a very marked attachment to the politics of bordering and its 
attendant anti-immigration harangues. This is namely a programme that desires 
a streamlining of the border and the ‘human capital’ considerations (Davies, 
2017) against which immigration is to be appraised. Made most explicit in Ian 
Duncan Smith’s candid remarks that ‘we [have] had a huge number of very low-
value…people coming through the EU’ (Brinkhurst-Cuff, 2017), neoliberalism 
does in fact wish to assume very clinical ownership over the border – a border 
that is made to the measure of the exploitable labour that capital most desires at 
any select moment. This neoliberal foundation that conceives of the nation as 
enterprise (Davies, 2014; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009) – and its population, 
therein, as a pooling of skill-sets and capitals – ably hitches itself to wider racial 
regimes by which people are deemed worthwhile, capable, and enterprising. A 
neoliberal remit does accordingly often court the politics of nation and its 
constitutive border instruments (e.g. immigration controls, fixed-term work 
visas, salary-thresholds, work restrictions on student visas, and the hollowing 
out of family unification protections). To intuitively assume that the neoliberal 
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and the nationalist are mutually adversarial remains herein a misnomer, and a 
dangerous one at that.  
 
Indeed, as follows an oft-neglected analysis of Hardt and Negri, the migrant 
might even be read as a figure who refuses the capitalist order. This might seem 
counterintuitive, but it is in the very act of rejecting the capitalist designation of a 
geographically stratified class role that the migrant becomes a disruptive, even 
cataclysmic, body. As they put it in their defining Empire, ‘Mobility and mass 
worker nomadism […] always expresses a refusal and a search for liberation: the 
resistance against the horrible conditions of exploitation and the search for 
freedom and new conditions of life’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 212). Put differently, 
whilst migrants might at times act as the reserve army of labour or a substratum 
of the proletariat (Miles, 1982) open to heightened forms of exploitation, the 
migrant does also render volatile the ethnonational territorialisation that global 
capitalism solicits. That neoliberalism, as a governmental logic, might become re-
enchanted by the border and its specific mandates is not herein entirely 
surprising when contextualized within this broader structural relationship of 
migration and ‘fixity’ to capitalism (Mbembe, 2018b). Capitalism has, in other 
words, always pressed a fixity/fluidity simultaneity – where enhanced mobility 
for some acts in concert with the attempted immobilizing/thwarting of others 
(Bhattacharyya, 2018). It is, accordingly, this split that helps further 
contextualize today’s neoliberal fascination with nationalist assertion – an 





That the Thatcherism documented in Hall’s formative analysis would culminate 
in the neoliberal ‘supernova’ (Duman et al. 2018) of Cameron’s austerity and 
marketization blitz was not unexpected. But that the same Thatcherism would 
culminate, through a different genealogy, in the nationalism of today is also not 
unexpected. We have asked accordingly that the sociology of nationalism and 
capitalism alike must stay more alive to how what was once a conjunctural 
affinity becomes, in time, the disjuncture of tomorrow. Affinities of capital and 
nation often come undone, gaining new autonomies and making political 
demands that are not always initially evident when first drafted.  
 
This reading of a capitalist conjuncture’s contingencies has tried in turn to draw 
upon Hall’s formative reading of capital and culture as perennially entangling 
and disentangling. One catalyzing cultural logic that was however relatively 
muted in Hall’s analysis is what Gilroy (2004) has named more recently as the 
distortions that arise via a wider longing for imperial time – a ‘melancholia’ that 
has taken on a more turbulent charge in the intervening political period. There 
is, in other words, a more psychoanalytic dimension that obtains when 
explicating any such nationalist rationality as articulated in its distinctly British 
mode. There is, after all, a thoroughly awkward embrace of past imperial hymns 
that renders Britain’s political logics vis-à-vis the nation and sovereignty 
sufficiently unique in form (Ashe, 2016; El-Enany, 2018). Put differently, and 
borrowing opportunistically from Gramsci’s (1930: 33) memorable phrasing, it 
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is possible to distill here those distinctly ‘morbid symptoms’ that arise in the 
‘interregnum’ period that characterizes Britain’s contemporary political culture: 
a period bookended by a remembered imperial supremacy on the one hand, and, 
on the other, a future order, exacerbated by climate breakdown perhaps, where 
British capitalism is reconciled to a more humble self-narration befitting of its 
‘provincial’ place in the world.   
 
There is, for instance, a recurring threat by arch-Brexiters to oversee a bonfire of 
any existing regulatory and fiscal check on capitalist evangelism – including the 
evisceration of workers’ rights, environmental and consumer regulations, as well 
as other redistributive and equality encumbrances. Even the much-discussed 
possibility of defaulting to WTO settings could be construed as a partial 
expression of this aspiration (Luyendijk , 2017). The underlying intimation is 
that a ‘Britannia’ thus ‘unchained’ (Kwarteng et al. 2012) stands to recover a 
leading market position in the global economy. This will certainly seem to most 
foreign observers a comical delusion – a notion of restored British glory in an 
era, not least, of ‘Chinese globalization’ (Shilliam, 2018: 175) being a particularly 
quixotic proposition. But it is the specific psychoanalysis of this hubris that 
remains for us politically consequential. What Gilroy (2004) calls melancholia 
trades on a hazily glimpsed and distinctly prettified sense of the putative moral 
clarity, public stability and global supremacy that colonial pre-war whiteness 
invokes – experiencing that past as prematurely lost and precipitating only 
abject decline and dysfunction. Melancholy is herein bleak and ‘pathological’ 
(98), prone to sublimating into a brinkmanship commanding political decisions 
so markedly anachronistic vis-à-vis the present circumstances and possibilities 
with which the state refuses to reconcile itself. And though this melancholia is 
usually couched within a broader conservative and/or a vernacular left 
temperament, it is increasingly evident that such melancholia can also claim for 
itself a more niche neoliberal register.  
 
However, as Gilroy also helped clarify, the playing out of an imperial delusion 
and misremembered time of social and moral coherence should not be seen only 
as a parlous political brinkmanship (though much of Brexit is certainly that 
[O’Toole, 2018]). Whilst any such capitalist sovereignty as presided over by the 
nation-state of ‘Rule Britannia’ vintage (Dorling and Tomlinson, 2019) cannot be 
resurrected, what this imperial hubris can certainly do is further glory in the 
revanchist politics of racial Othering that the politics of nation solicits: further 
anti-immigration harangues; further engage in high-profile demonstrations of 
bordering (via ‘Go Home’ vans, the deportation of black ‘criminals’, and the 
‘citizenship deprivation’ of pariah Muslims [Kapoor, 2019]); further engage in 
foolhardy neo-imperial wars and/or postures; and further circumscribe welfare-
state entitlements along implicit invocations of authentically white working-
class ‘deservingness’ (Shilliam, 2018; see also Bhambra, 2017; Narayan, 2017). 
This ‘postcolonial melancholia’ is herein not one that is oriented only towards 
implosion; it is also a melancholia that surveys the flesh and blood objects 
worthy of sharp rebuke (be it the EU and its constitutive migrants, but also, and 
more enduringly, the various iconic Others already in the nation’s midst). The 
fact that the one abiding ‘red line’ that Brexit proponents of all vintages 
(including its neoliberal cheerleaders) will not compromise on is the end to ‘free 
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movement’ – construed materially as immigration within the EU but also acting 
as a proxy expression of anti-immigrant sentiment more broadly – remains for 
us a particularly illustrative indication of this redirected melancholic populism.  
 
The melancholic adds in turn a unique affective field – operating through the 
textures of loss, mourning, solace and also hubris – to the broader nationalist 
energies as released through the conjunctural unwinding that this paper has 
hinted at. In other words, the second half of this Introduction has attempted to 
understand how the nationalisms consolidated by the Brexit impasse cut across 
a decidedly contradictory relationship to capitalism – a contradiction that 
induces a whole variety of nationalist expressions, be it neoliberal, anti-
neoliberal, or post-neoliberal. And, as Virdee and McGeever (2018) intimate, it is 
this very contradiction – or, properly put, a failure to read this contradiction – 
that has yielded such floundering analysis amongst a left intelligentsia of what 
the current political upheaval represents. Unable to read across the competing 
capitalist projects, so-called ‘Lexiters’viii have read the not insignificant working-
class Leave voteix as well as the multinational and establishment (e.g. CBI) 
affinity to the EU and free-movement as a signal indication of today’s nationalism 
constituting a valid (even if partly misdirected) anti-capitalist politics. 
Conversely, those leftists who intuitively oppose nationalism have 
understandably seen the provincial middle-class backing of Brexit, and Tory 
support more broadly, as undermining any ascription to it of an anti-capitalist 
yearning. But such critics have also at times failed to see that petit bourgeois and 
aspirational working-class investment in the textures and promises of nationalist 
reconsolidation is not in itself a capitalist politics (as in, furthering the baseline 
imperatives of accumulation and rent-seeking). We have argued that this is 
instead best read as a morality and political sensibility sourced in a particular 
era of capitalism – namely, ‘Little Englander’ Thatcherism – that is now 
operating, to some significant degree, outside of a neatly contained capitalist 
drive. 
 
The relevance of this analysis is two-fold. It first gestures at the particular 
historical context within which the distinctiveness of contemporary nationalism 
was seeded. Secondly, it frames the explicitly capitalist conditions within which 
this nationalism was nursed, but it also names the terms by which this 
nationalism becomes partially dislodged from that initial affinity to capitalism. 
The concluding intention of any such analysis, though only outlined in rather 
impressionistic terms as befitting an introductory statement, is to simply guard 
against certain recurring tendencies of a left analytic temperament. Whilst the 
worst of bad Marxism still sees the nation as hosting a popular vernacular as 
well as providing the figurations of collectivity through which anti-capitalist 
politics can be pursued; the best of prevailing Marxist orthodoxies have a 
complacent tendency to see nationalism as surfacing only in the interests of 
crisis resolution, diversion and ‘false consciousness’. Either way, we have used 
the closing stretch of this Introduction to note that today’s nationalism operates 
with an autonomy and confidence that, whilst possible to situate within 
capitalism, cannot be made to bend towards either capitalist or anti-capitalist 
programmes (when seen as coherent and discrete positions). Put bluntly, nation 
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i See Leddy-Owen (2019) and Norris and Inglehart (2019) for overviews of these causal theses 
currently prevalent.  
ii See Gupta and Virdee’s (2018) ‘European crises: contemporary nationalisms and the language 
of ‘race’’ for a crisp account of this centrality of race to today’s nationalisms.  
iii In populist discussion of the EU, the much-maligned European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) is mistakenly conflated with the EU, when in fact the ECHR predates the formalisation of 
EU authority and will remain active even upon any possible EU exit – unless formally annulled in 
a separate capacity.  
iv For instance, the febrile escalation of anti-EU campaigning in the run-up to the referendum 
drew pointed attention to how the refugees gathering across Europe threatened to replenish the 
already excessive minority groups within the UK – with whom the hordes at the gates share a 
ostensible commonality, via Islam, skin colour, or country of origin. This was made most 
notoriously visible in the ‘Breaking Point’ posted fronted by Nigel Farage.  
v Joshua Clover (2017) recently captured this tendency towards willful ahistoricism with an easy 
aphoristic elegance: as he put it, in the media sphere of hot-take shock at every far-right gain or 
action, ‘the world begins anew each day’.  
vi Insofar as, the contemporary practices of deportation and deprivation are concerned.  
vii See here the Sahra Wagenknecht-led ‘Aufstehen’ initiative in Germany as well as the positions 
taken of late by France’s Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Adler, 2019). But of particularly ominous 
relevance here is the recent electoral victory in Denmark of Mette Frederiksen’s Social 
Democrats; Frederiksen has overseen an aggressive acquiescence of the Social Democrats to the 
principles of hard-bordering and integrationist militancy as previously pressed by the populist 
Danish People’s Party (Henley, 2019). 
viii See two recent interviews with Gilroy where he contends that the ‘Lexiter’ position is a 
‘replaying’ (Gilroy et al. 2019: 183) of the Bennite tendency (‘the Benn school of English 
socialism’) of yesteryear, a tendency that, ‘whatever [its] other qualities’, constituted a key target 
for Gilroy (2019) in his landmark There Aint No Black in the Union Jack: ‘I wanted people to 
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identify and enter the uncomfortable space where Bennism and Powellism could be shown to be 
adjacent.’  
ix The precise class composition of the referendum vote, despite the simplifications of tabloid 
punditry, remains hotly contested. For an instructive reading, see Dorling et al. (2016) and Sayer 
(2017).  
 
